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THE  AMERICAN  ECONOMY of the mid-1990s has been a source of envy 
for the world and of puzzlement for macroeconomists. The civilian 
unemployment  rate has remained below 5 percent for one year and 
below 6 percent  for almost four years. Despite near  universal  forecasts 
in 1994 of accelerating inflation that would accompany a dip of the 
unemployment  rate below 6 percent, inflation  actually  decelerated  sig- 
nificantly  between 1994 and 1998. This benign outcome for inflation 
stands in contrast to the significant acceleration that occurred when 
unemployment  last dipped below 6 percent, in the late 1980s.I 
The failure of inflation  to accelerate  allowed the Federal  Reserve to 
avoid raising short-term  interest rates after early 1997, and even to 
lower  them  in late 1998. Freed  from  the restraint  of restrictive  monetary 
policy that had choked earlier  expansions, and with its fires stoked by 
the lowest medium-term  and long-term  nominal interest  rates in three 
decades, the economy charged ahead and achieved a state of  high 
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1. The four-quarter  rate of change of the chain-weighted  GDP deflator  decelerated 
from  2.5 percent  in 1994:3  to 1.0 percent  in 1998:2, in contrast  to its acceleration  from 
3.1 percent  in 1987:3  to 4.2 percent  in 1990:2 (see table 1 below). 
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growth-noninflationary bliss that some have dubbed  the "Goldilocks 
economy" (neither too hot nor too cold, but just right). Low interest 
rates and low inflation  combined to propel the American  stock market 
to valuation  levels without precedent, along the way creating $10 tril- 
lion of wealth in barely four years, and most of this wealth was still 
intact  after  the market  correction  in the summer  and  fall of 1998. Over- 
come with enthusiasm, one distinguished economist gushed, "This 
expansion will run forever."2 
While some observers have attributed  the miracle economy to the 
Fed's brilliant  monetary  policy, it is clear that the true heroine of the 
drama  is the deceleration  of inflation, and  the basic challenge for econ- 
omists is to explain that deceleration.3  Proposed  explanations  can be 
divided among  three  groups.4  The first  view announces  a revolution  and 
the arrival of a "new economy": the rapid growth of production  of 
high-technology  products,  many of which enjoy continuing  declines in 
prices, has rendered  obsolete previous capacity constraints  associated 
with the Phillips  curve, while globalization  has provided  low-technology 
products  in infinite quantity  at ever-lower prices.5 The second, which 
also denounces  the Phillips curve  view, argues  on econometric  grounds 
that the NAIRU (or "nonaccelerating inflation" rate of unemploy- 
ment), natural  rate hypothesis, and short-run  Phillips curve have never 
existed, even prior  to 1990.6 
2.  Rudiger Dornbusch, "Growth Forever," Wall Street Journal, July 30,  1998, 
editorial  page. 
3.  Compare  the two-year period ending in 1998:2 with the last two years of the 
previous expansion, ending in 1990:2. The annual  rate of nominal GDP growth was 
considerably  slower in the recent  period  than  in the earlier  period  (5.0 percent  compared 
with 7.0  percent), but inflation was so much lower (1.5 percent compared  with 4.3 
percent)  that  the annual  rate  of real GDP growth  was higher  (3.5 percent  compared  with 
2.7 percent).  Correspondingly,  the unemployment  rate  fell by more  over the most recent 
two-year  period, from  5.4 to 4.4 percent,  than  the slight decline from  5.5 to 5.3 percent 
observed  in the earlier  two-year  period. 
4.  While the present  account  places primary  emphasis  on inflation  behavior, there 
is also an independent  view of monetary  policy that predicts  steady  expansion  based on 
the long-term  bond market  acting as an automatic  stabilizer,  thus making  discretionary 
action by the Fed unnecessary;  see Gene Koretz, "A Golden  Age of Steady  Growth?", 
Business  Week, March 10,  1997,  p. 22. 
5.  The new economy advocates are led by Edward  Yardeni, chief economist of 
Deutsche  Morgan  Grenfell.  A skeptical  view is provided  in "Too Triumphalist  by Half," 
Economist,  April 25,  1998,  p. 29. 
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The third  view defends the natural  rate version of the Phillips curve 
and explains recent events as consistent with a decline in the NAIRU. 
Using techniques developed by Douglas Staiger, James Stock, and 
Mark  Watson, I have elsewhere provided  estimates that the NAIRU in 
the United States declined by a full percentage  point between the mid- 
1980s and mid-1990s. In this interpretation,  inflation accelerated in 
1987-89  but not in 1995-98,  because the actual unemployment  rate 
was significantly  below the NAIRU in the previous episode but not in 
the recent period.7 
The first  round  of papers  on the time-varying  NAIRU (hereafter  TV- 
NAIRU) in 1997 identified  the phenomenon  of the declining NAIRU in 
the 1990s but did not explain it. This paper  takes the next step. The list 
of candidate  explanations  is long and  can be roughly  grouped  into three 
sets: a first, general group  of explanations  not directly related  to wage 
or price behavior;  a second group  related  to wage behavior;  and a third 
related  to price behavior. 
General  candidates  include vague references  to the new economy or 
"a mysterious X factor that Alan Greenspan  believes is boosting the 
economy.  98  These hypotheses  run aground on the failure of measured 
productivity  growth to accelerate  significantly  in the  1990s.9 Another 
general candidate is the set of international  crises-in  Asia, Russia, 
Latin America, and elsewhere-which  have created a flight to quality 
Robert  Eisner. For instance, see his article "The Economy is Booming. So Why Are 
Economists  Glum?", Wall  Street  Journal, July 29, 1998, editorial  page. See also Levy 
(1997). 
7.  Staiger, Stock, and Watson  (1997); Gordon  (1997). The time series for the time- 
varying  NAIRU  created  by Staiger, Stock, and  Watson  is very similar  to mine when the 
same definition  of inflation  is used. See also Stock (1998); Stock and Watson  (1998b). 
8.  Andy Serwer, "The 'X Factor'? It's My Pal Bedford," Fortune, August 17, 
1998, p. 233. 
9.  Since the task is to explain the officially  measured  deceleration  of inflation,  it is 
the officially  measured  rate  of productivity  growth  that  matters;  any suspected  measure- 
ment error  would reduce  the inflation  rate and raise the rate of productivity  growth  by 
exactly the same amount  for any specified sector of the economy-for  example, the 
nonfarm  private  business sector-and  thus would not contribute  an explanation  for the 
measured  deceleration  of inflation.  Supporting  the view that  the officially measured  rate 
of productivity  growth has not accelerated,  the private  nonfarm  business productivity 
trend  used below to create  the productivity  deviation  variable  and  also to compute  trend 
unit  labor  cost registers  an annualized  rate  of increase  over 1987-98 of only 1.06 percent 
per year. Over  the shorter  six-year  period  ending in 1998:2, the annualized  growth  rate 
is  1.  11 percent per year. As interpreted  by my detrending  procedure, the level of 
productivity  was above trend  by 0.5 percent  in 1992:2 and by 0.9 percent  in 1998:2. 300  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
and the American "safe haven" in world capital markets,  resulting in 
the appreciation  of the dollar and the reduction  of both interest rates 
and import  prices in the United States. 
Hypotheses  involving wage behavior  point to weak labor unions, a 
secular  decline in the real minimum  wage, "heightened  job insecurity," 
and falling benefit  costs due primarily  to the revolution  in medical  care 
through  the development  of health  maintenance  organizations  (HMOs). 
Hypotheses  involving  price  behavior  are  the main  focus of this paper, 
which suggests  that  the low inflation  of the mid-  1990s resulted  from the 
confluence  of no fewer than  five beneficial  supply  shocks, each working 
to reduce  the inflation  rate  consistent  with any given unemployment  rate. 
Two of these  beneficial  shocks  are  the familiar  pair-changes in real  food 
and energy prices and in real import  prices-that  working in reverse 
played  such a large  role in creating  the twin peaks  of unemployment  and 
inflation  in 1974-75 and 1979-81,  and have now helped to create an 
inflation-unemployment  valley. The other  three  are  of more  recent  origin: 
a sharp  increase  in the rate  of deflation  of real computer  prices, a sharp 
reduction  in the  rate  of inflation  in real  medical  care  prices,  and  a reduction 
in measured  inflation  relative  to true  inflation  achieved  by improvements 
in the measurement  of official  price  indexes. 
Three of  these beneficial supply shocks are complementary  with 
others cited above. The flight of capital to a safe haven explains much 
of the decline in real  import  prices. The role of computer  prices  provides 
a quantifiable  measure  of the role of at least part  of the new economy. 
And the HMO-driven  decline in real medical care inflation  is the flip 
side of the decline in the rate of change of fringe benefits  that  has held 
down the growth  rate of employee compensation. 
Thus far, I have characterized  the major surprise  in the Goldilocks 
economy as the low rate of inflation  given the low rate of unemploy- 
ment, and indeed, this has been the focus of the media as well. But 
combined  with that surprise  there  have been several central  macroeco- 
nomic relationships  that are not surprises, and the task of explaining 
the contrast  between the surprises  and "nonsurprises" creates a com- 
plex and subtle interpretation  of the Goldilocks economy. While infla- 
tion has been low given the behavior of unemployment,  inflation has 
not been surprisingly  low given the behavior  of an alternative  measure 
of the economy's tightness:  the rate of capacity utilization. 
A parallel phenomenon  is that the behavior  of wages has not been Robert  J. Gordon  301 
surprising  given unemployment.  Unemployment  has been low and, as 
would be predicted by the standard  Phillips curve, wage rates have 
accelerated  substantially  between 1994 and 1998. Thus creating  a two- 
by-two matrix  consisting of two inflation  measures, price changes and 
wage changes, and two measures  of economic tightness, the capacity 
utilization rate and the unemployment  rate, gives two surprises-low 
inflation despite low unemployment  and accelerating wages despite 
relatively low utilization-and  two nonsurprises-accelerating wages 
responding  to low unemployment  and low inflation  responding  to rela- 
tively low capacity utilization. Stated another  way, the real questions 
about  the Goldilocks  economy are  why inflation  has been so low relative 
to changes in wages and  why the unemployment  rate  has declined when 
utilization has not increased.  10 
The aspect of these puzzles involving the relation  between price and 
wage changes  reveals a limitation  of previous  work  by myself and  others 
on the TV-NAIRU. This research  has focused entirely on equations  in 
which inflation  is explained  by lagged inflation,  the unemployment  gap, 
and various supply shocks, paying no attention at all to wages. This 
paper  is the first in the literature  to devote parallel attention  to wages 
and prices, and also to consider mutual  feedback between wages and 
prices. Can the inflation  rate be explained entirely by lagged inflation 
and other  variables, or does feedback  from wage behavior  play a role? 
Can wage changes be explained entirely by lagged wage changes and 
other variables, or does feedback from price behavior  play a role? 
I begin with a brief review of my traditional  inflation model and 
extend it to provide a simple method of estimating feedback between 
wage and price changes. In the following section I look briefly at the 
data  that  document  the deceleration  of inflation  and  at the quite  different 
behavior  of wage indexes that  include or exclude benefits, and  contrast 
wage and price behavior in  1994-98  with that in  1987-90.  I then 
develop quantitative  measures of the extent to which the behavior of 
price inflation  in 1993-98 represents  a surprise. 
The next section quantifies  the roles of the traditional  import  price 
and food-energy price supply shocks in the 1990s. In the following 
section, I assess the roles of computers,  medical  care, and  measurement 
10. I owe this characterization  to James Stock's comments  on the meeting  draft  of 
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changes in price changes by stripping  these effects from the official 
GDP and personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflators. I then 
estimate  new TV-NAIRUs  to demonstrate  the roles of these three more 
recent supply shocks. In the next section I review tests of feedback 
among wage and price equations and provide alternative  estimates of 
the TV-NAIRU taking these estimates into account. Finally, I sum- 
marize what is known about the likely behavior  of both the older and 
the more recent supply shocks over the next few years, and the impli- 
cations for the evolution of inflation  and of the TV-NAIRU. 
Modeling Inflation, the TV-NAIRU, and 
Mutual Wage-Price Feedback 
The Phillips curve has become a generic term for any relationship 
between the rate of change of a nominal  price or wage and the level of 
a real indicator  of the intensity of demand  in the economy, such as the 
unemployment rate. In the 1970s the simple Phillips relation was 
amended  by incorporating  supply shocks and  a zero long-run  trade-off. 
What emerged was an interpretation  of the Phillips curve that I have 
called the triangle model of inflation, in reference to the three basic 
determinants  of the inflation  rate:  inertia, demand, and supply." 
For example, a general specification  of this framework  would be 
(1)  pt =  a(L)pt,_  +  b(L)Dt  +  c(L)zt  +  et, 
where lower-case letters designate first differences of logarithms, up- 
per-case letters designate logarithms  of levels, and L is a polynomial 
in the lag operator.  The dependent  variablept  is the inflation  rate. Inertia 
is conveyed by the lagged rate  of inflation  pt_  l. Dt is an index of excess 
demand, normalized so that D,  =  0 indicates the absence of excess 
demand;  z, is a vector of supply shock variables, normalized so that 
11. Gordon (1977,  1982) and Gordon and King (1982) develop a model of the 
inflation  process  driven  by these three  factors.  The term  "triangle  model" was first  used 
in Gordon (1983).  The origins of the triangle model and additional  perspective are 
provided  in Gordon  (1997). Stock (1998, p. 3) cites Gordon  (1982) as the source  of the 
framework  that Stock, Staiger, and Watson  have used in estimating  the TV-NAIRU. Robert  J. Gordon  303 
z=  0  indicates an absence of  supply shocks; and et is  a serially 
uncorrelated  error  term.'2 
Usually, equation 1 will include several lags of past inflation  rates, 
reflecting the influence of several past years of inflation behavior on 
current  price-setting, through  some combination  of expectation  forma- 
tion and overlapping  wage and price contracts. If the sum of the coef- 
ficients  on these lagged inflation  values equals  unity, there  is a "natural 
rate" of the demand variable (Dt) consistent with a constant rate of 
inflation.'3  Subsequently, I provide alternative  versions of equation 1 
that  explain  wage changes, with and  without  two-way  feedback  between 
prices and wages. The basic equations  estimated  in this paper  use cur- 
rent and lagged values of the unemployment  gap as a proxy for the 
excess demand  parameter  Dt, where the unemployment  gap is defined 
as the difference between the actual rate of unemployment  and the 
natural  rate, and the natural  rate is allowed to vary over time. Use of 
the unemployment  rate as a predictor  of inflation  can be justified, for 
example, by the work of Robert King and Watson, who find that un- 
employment causes inflation in the Granger-causation  sense, by pre- 
ceding it in time.  1'  Alternatively, the capacity utilization rate is used 
as a proxy for the excess demand  parameter  Dt, and the natural  rate of 
the capacity utilization rate is also allowed to vary through  time. 
The structure  of the triangle model, with its distinction between 
demand and supply shocks, suggests a particular  conception of the 
NAIRU. The standard  concept is the unemployment  rate that  is consis- 
tent with steady inflation in the absence of supply shocks. To put it 
12. The theory  of real output, inflation,  and policy responses  to supply shocks was 
developed independently  by Gordon  (1975) and Phelps (1978), and is integrated  and 
summarized  in Gordon  (1984). 
13. While  the estimated  sum  of the coefficients  on lagged  inflation  is usually  roughly 
equal  to unity, that  sum  must  be constrained  to be exactly unity  for a meaningful  "natural 
rate" of the demand  variable  to be calculated. 
14. See King and  Watson  (1994). Inflation  depends  on both  the level of and change 
in the demand  variable.  I first  noted  the importance  of the rate  of change  effect in Gordon 
(1977, pp. 270-71). The rate  of change  effect is automatically  allowed to enter  as long 
as the gap variable  is entered  with more  than  one lag; in other  words, if the gap variable 
is entered  as, say, the current  value and one lagged value, this formulation  contains 
precisely  the same  information  as entering  the current  level and  change  from  the previous 
period.  The change  variable  is incorporated  in the present  paper,  as in previous  papers, 
by including  the current  and four lagged values of the unemployment  rate;  the zig-zag 
in the current  and lagged coefficients reflects  the change  effect, whereas  the significant 
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another  way, if the inflation  rate suddenly exhibits a spike that is en- 
tirely explained by the z, supply shock variables in equation 1, the 
standard  conception of the NAIRU measures the unemployment  rate 
that would be compatible  with steady inflation  in the absence of those 
supply shocks. Without this qualification, the NAIRU would jump 
around  as supply shocks came and went, which is not what most econ- 
omists are trying to convey when they speak of the natural  rate of 
unemployment. 
Allowing  the NAIRU to Vary over Time 
The estimation  of the time-varying  NAIRU (UN) combines inflation 
equation 1, with the unemployment  gap serving as the proxy for excess 
demand, and a second equation that explicitly allows the NAIRU to 
vary with time: 
(2)  Pt =  a(L)pt,1  +  b(L)(Ut-  Ut)  +  c(L)zt +  E, 
(3)  Ut, =  U>  +  t,,  ENq  =  0,  var(q)  =  T 
When  T in equation 3 is equal to zero the natural  rate is constant, and 
when it is positive the model allows the NAIRU to vary by a limited 
amount  each quarter.  If there  was no limit on the ability of the NAIRU 
to vary each time period, the time-varying  NAIRU would  jump up and 
down and soak up all the residual  variation  in the inflation  equation. 
The Interaction  of Wage and Price  Behavior 
Recent discussions of the time-varying NAIRU have focused on 
equations  explaining  price inflation,  because this concept of inflation  is 
the most directly relevant to monetary policy.  However, ever since 
Keynes's General Theory, the rate of change of wages has been be- 
lieved to play a central role in aggregate supply behavior. One direct 
indicator of the role of wages in the inflation process is provided by 
labor's share in national  income. The change in labor's share  (st) is by 
definition  equal to the growth  rate  of the real wage (wt -  pt) minus the 
growth rate of labor's average  product  (0): 
(4)  s,=  wt  -  0, -  Pt. 
It can be shown that  changes in labor's share  become a source  of "cost Robert  J. Gordon  305 
push" that is on an equal footing with any other  type of supply shock; 
an increase in labor's share pushes upward  on the rate of inflation at 
any given level of the unemployment  gap.  15 
The well-known stability of labor's share in the United States since 
the early 1970s suggests that  wage behavior  has not played much of an 
independent  role in the inflation  process. Nevertheless, it is informative 
to create estimates of the NAIRU corresponding  to the same dynamic 
estimation  framework  developed above. A straightforward  analogy to 
the basic inflation  equation  2 is an equation  explaining  changes in wage 
rates (wt) relative to trend productivity  (0*) by its own lagged values 
and the same set of demand and supply variables that enter into the 
price equation. The difference between the growth  rates of wage rates 
and  trend  productivity  is often called the growth  rate  of trend  unit labor 
cost (w-0*).  Thus 
(5)  (w  -  0*),-  g(L)(w  -  0*)t-.  +  b(L)(Ut  -  Ut)  +  c(L)zt  +  Et. 
As originally suggested by Christopher  Sims, the identification  of a 
wage equation  that  is separate  from  the price equation  is problematic.  16 
One approach  might be to include in the wage equation  different sets 
of demand and supply terms as explanatory  variables from those in- 
cluded in the price equation. But this is implausible  a priori, since any 
variable  relevant  as a determinant  of price change may also be relevant 
for participants  in the wage-setting process, and vice-versa for prices. 
Another  approach  might be to restrict  the contemporaneous  coefficient 
of wages on current prices or prices on current wages,  but this is 
arbitrary  as well. In this paper  I estimate  the time-varying  NAIRU  based 
on equation  5, which is a direct analogy to equation  2 and includes the 
same explanatory  variables, on the grounds  that the variables  relevant 
for wage behavior  are similarly relevant  for price behavior. 
However, equation  5 is restrictive  in that it does not allow for feed- 
back from prices to wages. In the present context, it is of particular 
interest  whether  wage changes were restrained  by the beneficial supply 
shocks that reduced the rate of price inflation,  and whether price 
changes were restrained  by factors that limited wage changes, for ex- 
ample, worker  insecurity. An alternative  wage equation, leaving open 
15. See Franz  and Gordon  (1993). 
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the relative importance  of wage-wage and  price-wage  feedback, can be 
written  as follows: 
(6)  (w  -  0*),  =  g(L)(w  -  0*)t-l  +  h(L)pt_ 
+  b(L)(Ut  -  Ut)  +  c(L)zt +  et. 
Equation  6 is the same as equation  5 but with the addition  of the lagged 
price inflation terms. A simple method of estimating the relative im- 
portance  of lagged wage and price inflation  is to transform  equation  6 
by adding and subtracting  h(L) times the lagged trend unit labor cost 
terms: 
(w  -  0*),  =  [g(L)  +  h(L)](w  -  0*) 
(7)  -  h(L)(w  -  0*  -P)t-1  +  b(L)(U,  -  UN) 
+  c(L)z,  +  e,. 
The sum of g(L) and  h(L) coefficients  can be constrained  to equal  unity, 
which imposes the natural  rate  hypothesis. The freely estimated  sum of 
coefficients (rh)  indicates the weight on lagged prices in the determi- 
nation of trend unit labor cost, while 1 -  Yh indicates the weight to 
be applied to wage-wage feedback. Henceforth  I call the w  -  0*  -  p 
term the change in trend labor share; note that this differs from the 
change in labor's share in equation  4 only through  the replacement  of 
actual productivity  change (0) by trend productivity  change (0*). By 
analogy, feedback  from  wages to prices can be estimated  by the "dual" 
to equation  7: 
(8)  pt  =  [g(L)  +  h(L)]pt-,  +  h(L)(w  -  0*  -p) 




where the change in trend labor share appears  with a positive sign, in 
contrast  to its negative sign in equation  7. 
To summarize, there are four sets of equations to estimate. While 
they all contain  the unemployment  gap and  the same set of supply  shock 
terms, they differ in the dependent  variable,  lagged dependent  variable, 
and lagged trend  labor  cost term, as follows: Robert  J. Gordon  307 
Dependent variable  Lagged dependent variable  Trend labor share? 
Price  change  Price  change  No 
Trend  unit labor  Trend  unit  labor  cost  No 
cost change  change 
Price  change  Price  change  Yes 
Trend  unit  labor  Trend  unit labor  cost  Yes 
cost change  change 
Basic Data and the Extent of the Inflation Surprise 
The postwar  inflation  experience  in the United States is well-known. 
There are three  basic price indexes for final goods: the chain-weighted 
GDP deflator, the chain-weighted deflator for personal consumption 
expenditures,  and the version of the Consumer  Price Index (CPI) that 
incorporates  the current  treatment  of shelter  costs back to 1967, the so- 
called CPI-U-X1. When four-quarter  moving average rates of change 
are plotted, the differences among these indexes are minor. Each has 
twin peaks in 1974-75  and 1980-81  and substantial  accelerations  of 
inflation  in periods  of relatively  low unemployment,  especially 1956-57, 
1965-72,  and 1987-90.  Common valleys are evident as well,  most 
notably in  1960-65;  1972-73,  presumably  influenced by the Nixon 
price controls; 1986, when oil prices collapsed; and 1997-98. 
Although  I do not present  such a plot, for reasons  of space, the recent 
behavior  of these price indexes and several wage indexes over the two 
most recent business cycles is summarized  in table 1. The table also 
shows the behavior of the two main tightness measures examined in 
this paper:  the unemployment  rate and the rate of capacity utilization. 
The unemployment  rate is reported  for four calendar  quarters:  1987:3 
and 1994:3 are chosen for being quarters  when the unemployment  rate 
first reached 6.0  percent along a cyclical path toward lower values, 
1990:2  is the cyclical peak quarter  of the previous  business expansion, 
and 1998:2 is the most recent quarter. Between 1994 and 1998 the 
unemployment  rate declined by more than twice as much as between 
1987 and 1990. In contrast, the rate of capacity utilization reveals a 
reduction  in cyclical tightness  in the more  recent  period  but an increase 
in tightness  in the earlier  period. 
For the selected price deflators, table 1 displays the four-quarter 
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Table 1. Basic Data, Selected Quartersa 
Percent 
Variable  1987:3  1990:2  1994:3  1998:2 
Excess demandb 
Civilian  unemployment  rate  6.0  5.3  6.0  4.4 
Capacity  utilization  rate  81.7  82.8  83.2  82.1 
Pricesc 
GDP deflator  3.1  4.2  2.5  1.0 
PCE  deflator  4.0  4.4  2.7  0.8 
CPI-U-X1  4.2  4.5  2.8  1.6 
Wages and productivityc 
ECI-total  compensationd  3.2  5.0  3.2  3.4 
ECI-wages and  salariesd  3.3  4.3  3.1  3.9 
Compensation  per  hour  3.3  5.5  1.5  4.2 
Average  hourly  earnings  2.7  3.8  2.5  4.2 
Output  per  hour  -0.3  1.0  0.4  1.9 
Source  Data are from the worldwide web pages of the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
a  See text for basis for selection of quarters 
b  Levels 
c  Four-quarter  rates of change 
d  Employment Cost Index 
deflators  exhibit a deceleration  during 1994-98 that contrasts  with an 
acceleration  between 1987 and 1990, although  the earlier  accelerations 
for the PCE deflator and the CPI are quite modest. The table also 
presents four-quarter  changes in four wage indexes and a productivity 
index. The contrast  between wage and price behavior  is quite marked. 
All four wage indexes accelerated  in 1994-98.  Further,  the 1994-98 
accelerations in compensation  per hour and average hourly earnings 
were actually  greater  than  for the same indexes in 1987-90. Productiv- 
ity accelerated  in both business cycles over the periods shown. 
Quantifying the Price  Surprise 
Table 1 suggests that the puzzle of low inflation in the mid-1990s 
applies to price behavior but not necessarily to wage behavior. Price 
inflation decelerated sharply as unemployment  fell during 1994-98, 
whereas wage inflation accelerated  in all four wage indexes shown- 
by much more in compensation  per hour and average  hourly earnings 
than in either Employment  Cost Index (ECI) measure  used. How much 
of a surprise  was the inflation  deceleration  of the mid-1990s? 
One straightforward  way to quantify  the inflation  surprise  is to com- Robert  J. Gordon  309 
pute the forecasting  error in my standard inflation equation 2 when the 
NAIRU  is  maintained  at a constant  value  throughout the  1980s  and 
1990s.  The exercise  can be carried out with the arbitrary NAIRU series 
that I used in research in the  1980s  and early  1990s  and published  in 
successive  editions of my macroeconomics  textbook until 1993, hence- 
forth the "textbook NAIRU."  This series rose gradually from the 1950s 
through the late 1970s,  to reflect demographic changes,  and after 1978 
was fixed at 6.0  percent.  As recently  as 1994,  I assessed  the accuracy 
of this series by running postsample dynamic simulations of equation 2 
and  noted  the  absence  of  substantial  drift  of  predicted  from  actual 
values. 17 
Throughout this paper, equations are estimated using a uniform sam- 
ple  period,  set  of  supply  variables,  and  set  of  lag  lengths,  chosen 
to  conform  with  my  inflation  research  since  1982.'8  The  wage  data 
refer to the Employment  Cost  Index,  with  ("ECI-TC")  and without 
("ECI-WS")  employee  fringe benefits.  For details,  see appendix A. 
The results  of  the  inflation  surprise computations  are presented  in 
table 2, which shows the actual and fitted values of equation 2 estimated 
with each  of  the three price indexes  shown  in table  1, and the actual 
and fitted values of equation 5 for both versions of the ECI. In the case 
of  each  dependent  variable,  the textbook  NAIRU  is used to compute 
the unemployment  gap,  and the sample period ends  in  1992:4.  Fitted 
values  starting in  1993:1  are computed  in a dynamic  simulation  that 
feeds  back the estimated,  rather than actual,  values  of the lagged  de- 
pendent variable. 
The largest simulation errors in table 2 are for the rate of change of the 
PCE deflator (below, I present the complementary result that the estimated 
TV-NAIRU for the PCE deflator declines more than for the other price 
indexes between the late 1980s and 1998).  Errors for the two trend unit 
labor cost variables are much smaller, and indeed, the error is positive for 
the ECI-WS, indicating that the acceleration in the ECI for wages  and 
17.  Gordon (1994).  I found  no evidence  that the actual inflation rate was  drifting 
down relative to the predicted inflation rate that assumed  a fixed NAIRU  of 6.0.  How- 
ever,  it soon became evident that the fixed NAIRU  approach should be abandoned,  and 
my first paper on the TV-NAIRU  was presented less  than a year later (Gordon,  1995). 
18.  That is,  since  Gordon (1982).  The one  change  is that the present paper uses  a 
shorter sample period,  beginning  in  1962:1.  Thus it is no longer  necessary  to link the 
Bureau of Economic  Analysis's  chain-weighted  deflators-available  only  since  1959- 
to the implicit deflators available  for the earlier period. 310  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
salaries after 1992:4 has been greater than would have been predicted by 
equation 5 on the basis of a fixed NAIRU of 6.0 percent. Correspondingly, 
I show below that the TV-NAIRU estimated for this wage index lies above 
6.0  percent during the 1990s. 
A question  raised by table 2 is why the inflation rates predicted for 
1998:2  using  the price  deflators were  roughly  the same  as the actual 
rates for  1994:3  shown  in table  1. Why was there no predicted accel- 
eration of inflation,  since  the natural rate hypothesis  forecasts  that the 
actual unemployment rate, continually below the fixed textbook NAIRU 
of 6.0  percent after 1994:3,  should have caused inflation to accelerate? 
The simple  answer is that an acceleration  in the predicted values  was 
prevented by the combined effect  of the relative import price and rela- 
tive food-energy  variables, which held down the inflation rate by a large 
amount.  While  the impact of these variables can be documented  with 
the textbook NAIRU used to construct the results in table 2, I prefer to 
quantify their impact using newly estimated time-varying NAIRUs  (see 
table 4 below). 
New TV-NAIRU Estimates for Inflation, 
Stripped Inflation, and Labor Cost 
The prediction errors for the price indexes  displayed  in table 2 sug- 
gest that the natural rate hypothesis  remains valid in the 1990s  only if 
the estimated  TV-NAIRU  (incorporating  equations  2  and 3)  declines 
substantially from its values  in the late  1980s.  This is indeed the case. 
Figure  1 plots the actual unemployment  rate against new TV-NAIRUs 
for the three basic inflation indexes.  The TV-NAIRUs  are quite stable, 
remaining within a narrow band between 5.3 and 6.5 percent throughout 
the past four decades.  Since  1989, the TV-NAIRU  for the PCE deflator 
has been somewhat  lower than those for the GDP deflator and the CPI- 
U-X1,  dropping below  5.5  percent  in  1995:1  and stabilizing  at 5.31 
percent in the last four quarters. The TV-NAIRU  for the GDP deflator 
has fallen  from a value of 6.36  percent as recently  as  1988:3 to reach 
a final value of 5.68  percent in 1998:2. Robert].  Gordon  311 
Table  2. Actual and Simulated  Values  of Price and Wage  Changes, Using Alternative 
Indexes  and Constant  NAIRUa 




1998.2  resUltSb 
mean-squared  Mean 
Index  Actual  Simulated  Error  error  error 
GDP deflator  1.01  2.31  -1.30  0.82  -0.46 
PCE  deflator  0.85  2.86  - 2.01  1.24  -  1.01 
CPI-U-X1  1.61  3.19  -1.58  0.89  -0.59 
Trend  unit  labor  cost 
ECI-total compensation  2.35  3.13  -0.78  0.99  -0.52 
ECI-wages  and  salaries  2.87  1.98  0.89  0.77  0.47 
Source: Author's calculations 
a. Specification of equations given by equations 2 and 5 in text; sample period is 1962:1-1992:4  Dynamic simulation is 
from 1993:1 to 1998:2. See appendix A for details of variables and lag lengths. 
b  Four-quarter  percent changes. 
The Smoothness Issue 
The smoothness  issue  becomes  evident  when equations 2 and 3 are 
examined.  One faces the inescapable choice of either setting the NAIRU 
as a constant  and allowing  all the residual  variation to remain in the 
error term of equation 2, or allowing some or all of the residual variation 
to create movements  in the TV-NAIRU.  In their latest research,  Stock 
and Watson  allow  the standard deviation  term (T,) to be estimated.'9 
Identifying this parameter does not restrict the relationship between the 
variances of the error terms in equations 2 or 3; the model is identified 
by  the  assumption  that the TV-NAIRU  is  a random walk  (or,  more 
generally,  integrated of order one).  They prove that if the variance of 
the change  in the TV-NAIRU  is  small  relative  to the variance  of  the 
error in equation 2,  their estimator is asymptotically  median unbiased. 
In the present paper,  I adopt this new methodology.20  My baseline 
estimates of the TV-NAIRU  are based on Stock and Watson's  median- 
unbiased estimator,  T,;  for  the GDP  deflator,  the estimate  is  0.090. 
19. Stock and Watson  (1998b). 
20.  The details  of this approach  as applied  to estimation  of the TV-NAIRU  are laid 
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Figure  1. Actual  Unemployment  Rate and TV-NAIRUs  for Price  Indexes,  1961-98 
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However,  this point estimate changes with the specification  and it also 
has considerable sampling uncertainty. Moreover, it is useful to contrast 
the TV-NAIRUs  obtained by this new method with those obtained using 
the judgmental  method set forth in my previous  paper, whereby  ,  is 
chosen  so that the TV-NAIRU  is allowed  to vary,  subject to the con- 
straint that it is  not to exhibit  short-term reversals.21 As  a sensitivity 
analysis,  therefore,  I also consider  alternative values for this standard 
deviation. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effects  of estimating  equation 2 for the GDP 
deflator using four different values for the imposed standard deviation: 
0.045,  0.090,  0.136,  and 0.271.  The solid  line  plots  the TV-NAIRU 
series  that results  from  imposing  a  standard deviation  of  0.090,  as 
henceforth in this paper.22 With higher standard deviations,  the result- 
21.  See Gordon  (1997). 
22.  The corresponding  coefficients are reported  below in table 3. Robert  J. Gordon  313 
Figure 2. TV-NAIRUs  for the GDP Deflator,  Alternative  Standard  Deviations, 
1961-98 
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ing series exhibit short-term reversals that are slight for a value of 0. 136 
and increasingly  noticeable  for a value  of  0.271.23  Imposing  a lower 
standard deviation  of 0.045  results in a slightly  smoother series. 
Clearly,  the extent  to which  the TV-NAIRU  declines  between  the 
late  1980s  and 1998 depends  on the choice  of smoothness  parameter. 
As  the smoothness  parameter is  increased  across  the four alternative 
values shown in figure 2,  the series  declines  by 0.38,  0.67,  0.84,  and 
1. 15 percentage points,  respectively,  between  1988:1 and 1998:2.  The 
criterion that the resulting TV-NAIRU  series be free of short-term re- 
versals might lead some to stop at a higher standard deviation,  such as 
0.136  instead of 0.090;  and any choice  of a higher standard deviation 
will boost the amount by which the estimated  TV-NAIRU  declines  in 
23.  The computer  programs  that implement  the methodology  of Stock and Watson 
(1998b) do not directly constrain  the value of the T  parameter,  but rather  a related 
parameter,  X. The research  in this paper  is based on integer values of X that translate 
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the  1990s  and reduce the errors reported below  in explaining  the ob- 
served inflation rates of 1998.  In the conclusion  to this paper, however, 
I  provide  a  complete  decomposition  of  the  inflation  surprise  of  the 
1990s,  consisting  of two error terms, the part of the decline  in the TV- 
NAIRU that the model cannot explain,  and the remaining residual error. 
The higher the assumed standard deviation of the TV-NAIRU,  the larger 
will  be  the part of  the decline  that the model  cannot explain  and the 
smaller will  be the remaining residual error. 
Estimated Coefficients 
Table 3 displays  the estimated coefficients  for equations 2 and 5 for 
the GDP and PCE deflators and the two labor cost variables.  The coef- 
ficients  on the deflator equations  are similar to my previous  research, 
with those on the sum of lagged dependent variables very close to unity, 
those  on the sum of unemployment  gap variables around -0.6,  those 
on the productivity deviation around -0.1,  those on the relative import 
price of 0. 1, those on the food-energy  effect  of about 0.7  for the con- 
sumption deflator but an insignificant  0.2  for the GDP deflator.24 The 
bottom panel of the table displays  results of postsample  dynamic sim- 
ulations that truncate the sample period at 1992:4.  Both price equations 
overpredict  the rate of  inflation in the first half of  1998 by roughly  1 
percentage point. 
The coefficients  for the labor cost equations (using the specification 
in equation 5) are similar to those in the inflation equations,  as are the 
goodness-of-fit  statistics.25 The slope of the Phillips curve is somewhat 
flatter, and neither the food-energy  nor productivity  variables are sig- 
nificant. However,  both the import price effect and the "Nixon  controls 
24.  See Gordon  (1982, table 2, pp. 103-04;  1997, table 1, p. 25). In the present 
paper, lags thirteen  to twenty-four  are highly significant  in the price equations  reported 
in table 3 and  contribute  30 percent  and 27 percent  of the total sum  of lagged  coefficients 
on the GDP and PCE deflator  equations,  respectively. While the sum of coefficients on 
the food-energy  effect in the GDP deflator  equation  is insignificant,  an exclusion test 
indicates  that this set of lagged variables  makes a contribution  to the fit of the equation 
at a better  than 1 percent  significance  level. 
25.  The ECI series for total compensation  and for wages and salaries  extend back 
only to 1980. For this exercise they are extrapolated  back to 1948 with a mix-adjusted 
average  hourly  earnings  series that  I developed  in earlier  research,  which is adjusted  for 
fringe benefits when extrapolating  the total compensation  ECI. See appendix A for 
further  details. m  "C  t 
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on"  variable  are significant.  It is  notable  that the mean error of  the 
equation for the ECI-WS is exactly zero in early 1998,  highlighting  the 
sharp contrast between  the wages  and salaries version  of the ECI and 
the other variables already evident  in the forecasting  errors of table 2. 
Figure  3 presents  the TV-NAIRU  estimates  for the two  trend unit 
labor cost series in comparison with the basic TV-NAIRU  estimate for 
the PCE deflator. As can be seen,  the trend unit labor cost TV-NAIRUs 
display very similar behavior to the series for the PCE deflator until the 
1990s,  when they diverge markedly. In contrast to the plummeting TV- 
NAIRU  for the PCE deflator, that for ECI-WS creeps up somewhat to 
6.55  percent throughout  1996-98,  while  that for the ECI-TC declines 
only  slightly  and reverses  itself,  to end at 6.13  percent in 1998:2.  The 
fact that the TV-NAIRU  for ECI-WS is roughly the same in 1998 as in 
1988  indicates  that most  of  the  corresponding  0.3  percentage  point 
decline  for the ECI-TC can be attributed to the sharp decline  in the rate 
of increase of benefit compensation  over the 1990s. Robert  J. Gordon  317 
Contribution of Supply Shock Variables 
As indicated in table 3, the specification  of the basic inflation equa- 
tion  2  includes  four sets  of  supply  shock  variables  (food  and energy 
prices,  import prices, productivity deviation,  and Nixon price controls) 
in addition to lagged inflation and the unemployment gap. In this section 
I  am  particularly  interested  in  quantifying  the  degree  to  which  the 
significant  post-1992  decline  in  real  import  prices,  reinforced  by  a 
decline  in  real  food  and  energy  prices,  explains  the  absence  of  an 
accelerating  inflation rate in the mid-1990s  despite  the relatively  low 
unemployment rate.26  One way to assess the impact of food-energy  and 
import prices in holding down inflation is to estimate the basic equation 
for each price index through 1992:4 and compute a dynamic simulation 
through  1998:2  using  the previously  estimated  TV-NAIRU  but artifi- 
cially  setting the food-energy  and import price variables equal to zero. 
The  results  of  this  exercise  for both the GDP  and PCE deflators  are 
summarized in table 4.  The third column displays  for 1998:2 the sim- 
ulation errors with actual values  of the import and food-energy  effects 
and, by contrast,  the errors when either or both effects  are set to zero. 
The results indicate that the food-energy  and import price effects  in the 
four quarters ending  1998:2  were  holding  down  inflation in the GDP 
deflator by  1.42  percentage  points  and in the  PCE deflator by  1.39 
percentage  points,  and that most  of  this difference  was  made by the 
import price  effect.  These  effects  combine  the  static  impact  of  the 
coefficients  as shown in table 3, which contribute about 0.93  percentage 
point to the PCE deflator,  and the dynamic  feedback  from the lagged 
inflation variable,  which contributes the remainder.27 
Explaining the Decline in the NAIRU 
I have shown that the combined  impact of  import prices  and food- 
energy prices helps substantially in the explanation of why inflation did 
26.  The four-quarter  rate  of change  of the relative  import  price variable  was -6.34 
percent  in 1997:2  and -  6.00 percent  in 1998:2;  the corresponding  figures  for the food- 
energy  effect were -0.19  percent  and -0.39  percent,  respectively. 
27.  Taking  the PCE deflator  coefficients in table 3 and the values of the variables 
reported  in the previous  footnote, the static import  price effect is 0.  11 times -6.0,  and 
the food-energy  effect is 0.70 times -0.39. 318  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
Table  4. Actual and Simulated  Values  of Price Changes, Using Alternative  Indexes 
and Time-Varying  NAIRUa 





mean-squared  Mean 
Index  Actual  Simulated  Error  error  error 
GDP deflator 
Actual  values  1.01  1.78  -0.77  0.60  -0.25 
Omitting  food-energy  effect  1.01  1.91  -0.90  0.65  -0.32 
Omitting  import  price  effect  1.01  3.08  -2.07  1.16  -0.85 
Omitting  both  effects  1.01  3.20  -2.19  1.22  -0.91 
PCE deflator 
Actual  values  0.85  1.90  -1.05  0.70  -0.46 
Omitting  food-energy  effect  0.85  2.29  -  1.44  0.96  -0.66 
Omitting  import  price  effect  0.85  2.90  -2.05  1.18  -0.95 
Omitting  both  effects  0.85  3.29  -2.44  1.43  -1.14 
Source. Author's calculations 
a. Specification of equations given by equation 2 in text, sample period is  1962 1-1992  4  Dynamic simulation is from 
1993:1 to 1998 2. See appendix A for details of variables and lag lengths 
b  Four-quarter  percent changes 
not accelerate in 1996-98.  This does not, however,  explain the decline 
in the TV-NAIRU  for the deflators,  since  the influence  of  the supply 
shock  variables  is  controlled  in  the  process  of  estimating  the  TV- 
NAIRU.  Stated another way,  the combined impact of import prices and 
food-energy  prices  does  not help  to  explain  why  actual inflation  de- 
celerated  rather than staying  roughly  stable.  I now  consider  to  what 
extent the decline  in the TV-NAIRU  depicted in figure 1 can be attrib- 
uted to the role of computer prices,  medical  care prices,  and improve- 
ments in the measurement of prices. 
Table 5 provides,  for selected  quarters, basic data from the Bureau 
of Economic  Analysis  (BEA)  on the shares of computers and medical 
care in both GDP  and personal  consumption  expenditure,  as well  as 
four-quarter changes  in the deflators for GDP,  PCE,  total computers, 
consumption  computers,  and medical care goods  and services.  In view 
of  the  much-hyped  new  economy,  it  is  surprising  to  learn  that the 
nominal  share of computers (including  producers' durable equipment, 
consumption,  government,  and net exports) did not grow at all between 
1988 and 1998.  The share of computers in real GDP grew enormously, Robert  J. Gordon  319 
Table  5. Data on Computers  and Medical Care, Selected Quarters 
Percent 
Change 
Item  1988:1  1993:1  1998:2  1988-98a 
Nominal  expenditure  shares 
Total  computers  in GDP  1.2  0.9  1.2  0.0 
Consumption  of computers  in PCE  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.2 
Medical  care  goods and  services  in GDP  9.6  12.1  11.9  2.3 
Medical  care  goods and  services  in PCE  14.4  17.6  17.4  3.0 
Four-quarter  rates  of change  of deflators 
GDP deflator  3.0  2.7  1.0  -2.0 
PCE  deflator  3.7  2.9  0.9  -2.8 
Total  computers  -9.6  -19.8  -33.5  -23.9 
Consumption  of computers  -7.7  -29.1  -34.3  -26.6 
Medical  care  goods and  services  6.0  6.0  2.1  -  3.9 
Source  Unpublished data provided directly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
a  In lower panel, column gives change in the four-quarter  rates of change 
from 0.6  to 6.1  percent,  but this  simply  reflects  the sharp decline  in 
computer prices rather than an increase in the importance of computer 
spending.  It is the nominal  shares that are used in the computation  of 
chain-weighted  deflators  and that determine  the  impact  of  computer 
prices  on overall  inflation.  The  share of  medical  care is  much larger 
than that of computers  in both GDP and PCE,  and it grew by a much 
larger absolute amount between  1988 and 1993,  after which it remained 
on a high plateau. 
The growing  impact of computers on overall  inflation performance 
reflects not the increase in their nominal share but rather a sharp accel- 
eration in their rate of  price  decline:  from an average  annual rate of 
-  13 percent during 1988-93  to -28  percent during 1993-98,  reaching 
a peak of  -  37  percent  in mid-1997.  With  a share of  1.2  percent  in 
GDP  and a rate of  price  decline  of  -  34  percent  in the  year ending 
1998:2,  computers deducted  -0.41  percentage  point from the rate of 
change of  the GDP deflator,  helping  to explain  why  inflation  has re- 
cently been so low  (the actual impact is more severe  than  -  0.4,  due 
to the dynamic  contribution  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable).  It is 
important to note that if both the computer share in spending  and the 
rate of price decline  stabilize at present levels,  computers will make no 
further contribution to the deceleration  of inflation. 
The lower panel of table 5 contrasts the inflation rates of the GDP 320  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998 
and PCE deflators with the implicit  deflator of medical  care.  It shows 
that medical care inflation substantially boosted overall inflation in both 
1988  and  1993,  with  a wedge  that declined  to  zero  in  1996-97  but 
reemerged in 1998 when overall  inflation decelerated further but med- 
ical care inflation did not. 
In addition  to  computers  and medical  care,  a third factor holding 
down the measured rate of inflation has been changes  in measurement 
methodology  during the 1990s.  Measurement improvements in the CPI 
are estimated  to have reduced measured inflation relative to actual in- 
flation by an amount that grew gradually from  -0.1  percentage point 
in 1992 to  -0.46  percentage point in early 1998. Moreover, the BEA's 
1998 benchmark revision has, in translating price changes for individual 
CPI components  into the measures used in the PCE deflator, introduced 
several changes  in CPI methodology  that were applied retroactively  as 
far back as 1995:1.  The net impact of these measurement changes  was 
to reduce the measured inflation rate in early  1998 by 0.73  point com- 
pared with the rate that would have been estimated under the method- 
ology  used  before  1992.28 
Table 6 computes the contributions of computers,  medical care, and 
the CPI measurement adjustment to GDP and PCE inflation,  as well  as 
to the TV-NAIRU,  in the four-quarter periods ending  1988:1,  1993:1, 
and 1998:2.  The fourth column  measures the change  between  1988:1 
and 1998:2.  Of particular importance are the data showing  the impact 
of the three factors taken together: from 0.14  percentage point in 1988:4 
to  -0.60  percentage point in 1998:2 for the GDP deflator (a change of 
-0.74  percentage point),  and from 0.35  to -0.45  percentage point for 
the PCE deflator (a change of  -0.80  percentage point). To summarize, 
it was determined above that the static impact of the import price and 
food-energy  terms was  to  hold  down  the  rate of  change  of  the  PCE 
deflator by  -0.93  percentage point in the four quarters ending  1998:2, 
and these  three "new"  supply  shocks  contribute another  -0.80  per- 
centage  point in reducing  inflation between  1993  and 1998.  Thus the 
total static impact of the five supply shocks is  -  1.73 percentage points. 
To determine how much difference the three new factors make to the 
TV-NAIRU,  one can strip computers,  medical  care,  and the CPI mea- 
surement  adjustment,  as  well  as  all  three effects  together,  from  the 
28.  See appendix  A for details and sources  for the CPI measurement  adjustment. Robert  J. Gordon  321 
Table  6. Effects of Computers,  Medical Care, and Price Measurement  on Inflation 
and the TV-NAIRU,  Selected Quarters 
Percent 
Change 
Item  1988:1  1993:1  1998:2  1988-98a 
GDP deflator,  impact  of stripping 
Computers  -0.15  0.22  -0.40  - 0.25 
Medical  care  goods and  services  0.30  0.44  0.16  -0.14 
Changes  in price  measurement  0.00  -0.07  -0.36  - 0.36 
All three  components  0.14  0.13  -0.60  -0.74 
PCE  deflator,  impact  of stripping 
Computers  -0.03  -0.09  -0.16  -0.13 
Medical  care  goods and  services  0.37  0.65  0.23  -0.14 
Changes  in price  measurement  methods  0.00  -0.10  - 0.52  - 0.52 
All three  components  0.35  0.44  -0.45  -0.80 
TV-NAIRU  for GDP deflator 
Official  6.36  6.05  5.68  -0.67 
Deflator  stripped  of 
Computers  6.34  6.09  5.76  -0.58 
Medical  care  6.24  6.05  5.69  -0.55 
Measurement  adjustments  6.36  6.16  5.86  -0.50 
All three  components  6.27  6.22  6.03  -0.24 
TV-NAIRU  for PCE  deflator 
Official  6.42  5.77  5.31  -  1.11 
Deflator  stripped  of 
Computers  6.44  5.81  5.37  -  1.07 
Medical  care  6.28  5.78  5.40  -0.88 
Measurement  adjustments  6.46  5.96  5.59  -0.87 
All three  components  6.29  5.96  5.67  -0.62 
Source: Author's calculations based on unpublished data provided directly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
a  Third column minus first column. 
deflators,  and  then  compute  new TV-NAIRUs  for each stripped  deflator. 
By comparing  each stripped  TV-NAIRU  to the nonstripped  series plot- 
ted in figure 1, one can assess the total impact  of the three new factors 
on the TV-NAIRU. Table 6 compares  each stripped  TV-NAIRU with 
the nonstripped  TV-NAIRU and in the fourth column calculates the 
change  between 1988:1  and 1998:2. For  the GDP deflator,  the stripping 
process  explains -  0.43 percentage  point of the total decline in the TV- 
NAIRU  of -0.67  percentage  point. For the PCE deflator,  the stripping 
process explains -0.49  percentage  point of the total TV-NAIRU de- 
cline of  -  1.  11 percentage  points. Thus the stripping  exercise explains 322  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
64 percent of the decline in the TV-NAIRU for the GDP deflator  and 
44 percent  for the PCE deflator. 
Contrasts between Wages and Prices and between 
Unemployment and Capacity Utilization 
The basic data in table 1 and the TV-NAIRUs shown in figures 1 to 
3 call attention  to a sharp  contrast  between the behavior  of wages and 
that of prices in the mid-1990s. Far from exhibiting weak behavior  as 
a result of structural  factors in labor markets,  such as labor insecurity 
or weak unions, wage changes have if anything  accelerated  more than 
would have been expected from the precedent set in the economic 
expansion of the late 1980s. The TV-NAIRU for the wage and salary 
component  of the ECI drifts  up slightly from 1990 to 1998, contrary  to 
the decline in the series for the price deflators;  and although  the TV- 
NAIRU for the total compensation  ECI measure  does decline slightly, 
this can be entirely attributed  to a slowdown in benefit growth, which 
is largely the counterpart  of the moderation  in medical care inflation. 
The contrasting  behavior of prices and wages raises the intriguing 
issue of how they have interacted.  Was there feedback from prices to 
wages, so that the influence of the five beneficial supply shocks iden- 
tified above held down wages? Was there  feedback  from  wages to prices 
such that without the influence of accelerating  wages, inflation  would 
have decelerated  even more than actually  occurred?  I test for the pres- 
ence of feedback  effects by estimating  equations  7 and 8, which intro- 
duce the change in trend  labor  share  (that  is, the difference  between the 
changes in trend unit labor cost and in the appropriate  inflation rate) 
into the wage and  price equations,  respectively. Positive feedback  from 
wages to prices, as in equation 8, should yield a positive sum of coef- 
ficients on the change in trend  labor's share, whereas  positive feedback 
from prices to wages, as in equation  7, should yield a negative sum of 
coefficients. 
The results of estimating  equations  7 and 8 are presented  in table 7, 
which shows the impact of adding eight lags of changes in the trend 
labor share  variable  to each of the equations  displayed  in the first  three 
columns of table 3. The table reports  changes in the regressions' sum- 
mary statistics, the standard  error  of estimate and the sum of squared Lj  -  'I  0  r-r-- 
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residuals, that result from adding the set of trend labor share lags; it 
also reports  the sums of coefficients, the significance  level of the sum, 
and  the significance  level of an exclusion test on the set of eight lagged 
variables. The results indicate that in the wage equations  (the last two 
rows) the sum of coefficients on the feedback  terms  is highly significant 
and  has the correct  sign, whereas  in the price equations  (the second and 
fourth rows) the sum of coefficients is not significant. These results 
suggest that the deceleration of inflation in 1994-98  helped to keep 
wages from accelerating  more than they actually did, but there is no 
parallel  claim that  the acceleration  of wages helped to keep prices from 
decelerating  more than they actually did. 
I have also estimated  a full set of TV-NAIRUs (not shown) for each 
equation summarized  in table 7. With wage feedback, in 1998:2 the 
price equations exhibit TV-NAIRUs that are roughly 0.15 percentage 
point lower than those displayed in figure 1, indicating that allowing 
for the acceleration  of wages, the puzzle of low inflation  would have 
been even deeper than suggested by the basic equation 2 that ignores 
wage-to-price feedback. With price feedback from the consumption 
deflator,  the TV-NAIRU for the ECI-TC  wage variable  is almost iden- 
tical to the basic result for equation 5 shown in figure 3. With price 
feedback from the GDP deflator, in  1998:2 the TV-NAIRU is 6.31 
percent  compared  with 6.08 percent  with that  feedback  effect indicating 
that  allowing for the feedback  from  decelerating  prices  boosts the extent 
to which wages exhibit an acceleration. 
The Capacity  Utilization Rate as an Alternative Demand  Variable 
The basic data presented  in table 1 also display a contrast  between 
the behavior of the unemployment  rate and that of the capacity utili- 
zation rate (for manufacturing,  mining, and utilities) over the past two 
business expansions. From 1987 to 1990 the capacity utilization rate 
increased, while from 1994 to 1998 it decreased. It is possible to esti- 
mate a NAIRCU (or "nonaccelerating  inflation" rate of capacity uti- 
lization); the analogy to the sharp decline in the TV-NAIRU in the 
1990s for the price deflators  would be a sharp increase in the corre- 
sponding  TV-NAIRCU.  However, as illustrated  in figure  4, only a mild 
increase is observed. Since the variance  of the capacity  utilization  rate 
is about  three  times that  of the unemployment  rate, the decline of about Robert  J. Gordon  325 
Figure 4. Actual Capacity  Utilization  Rate and TV-NAIRCU  for the PCE Deflator, 
1961-98 
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Source: Worldwide web page of the Bureau of Economic Analysis and author's calculations. 
1 percentage  point in the TV-NAIRU for the unemployment  rate ob- 
served for the PCE deflator  in figure 1 and table 6 should have been 
accompanied  by an increase  in the TV-NAIRCU  of about  3 percentage 
points. In fact, the TV-NAIRCU  increased  by about 1 percentage  point 
between 1990 and 1998. Figure  4 shows that actual  capacity  utilization 
was below the TV-NAIRCU  in 1998, consistent with decelerating  in- 
flation, whereas in figure 1 the actual unemployment  rate was below 
the TV-NAIRU, implying accelerating  inflation.29 
29.  Using the methodology  of this paper,  I have examined  an additional  measure  of 
demand  tightness:  the demographically  adjusted  unemployment  rate  recently  developed 
by Robert  Shimer  (forthcoming).  My results  confirm  Shimer's  view that  changes in the 
TV-NAIRU  can be almost entirely attributed  to changes in the age composition  of the 
unemployed-but only through  1990. Contrary  to his claim that  the same is true  of the 
1990s, I find that the TV-NAIRU based on Shimer's data on the demographically 
adjusted unemployment  rate actually declines slightly more than the standard  TV- 
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Conclusion 
This paper  attempts  to explain the outstanding  macroeconomic  per- 
formance  of the U.S. economy in the 1990s. The explanation  of the so- 
called Goldilocks economy turns  largely, if not entirely, on the expla- 
nation of the deceleration  of inflation  that has accompanied  a marked 
decline in the unemployment  rate over 1994-98.  The conventional 
natural  rate hypothesis, by contrast, would have predicted  that such a 
decline in the actual  unemployment  rate  would have been accompanied 
by an acceleration  of inflation  if the NAIRU had remained  constant. 
Decomposition  of Proposed  Explanations 
How great  would that  predicted  acceleration  have been, and  how can 
the alternate  observed deceleration  be explained?  A complete decom- 
position of the contribution  of this paper  is provided  in table 8. I take 
as a point of departure  the textbook NAIRU of an arbitrary  and fixed 
6.0 percent that I used in research  prior to 1995, which predicts that 
the inflation  rate  for the GDP deflator  would have accelerated  from 2.5 
percent  in 1994:3 to 3.73 percent  in 1998:2 if there  had  been no change 
in the real prices of food, energy, and  imports  (all figures  in this section 
refer to four-quarter  rates of change ending in the designated  quarter). 
The last row of table 8 reminds  one that the inflation  rate in 1998:2 
was not 3.73 percent but 1.01 percent. This leaves a glaring error  of 
2.72 percentage  points to be explained. Slightly more than half of the 
required  explanation  is provided  by the contribution  of the traditional 
supply shocks, since the actual declines in the real prices of food, 
energy, and imports explained a decline in the inflation rate of  1.42 
percent. Thus the predicted  inflation  rate net of the traditional  supply 
shocks that actually  occurred  was just 2.31 points. Using the estimated 
TV-NAIRU rather  than the fixed NAIRU of 6.0 percent assumed ini- 
tially further  reduces the predicted  inflation  rate from 2.31 percent to 
1.78 percent; of this additional  reduction, about half is explained by 
the role of computers, medical care, and measurement  changes. This 
leaves an unexplained  error  of  -  0.77 percentage  point in explaining 
the actual inflation  rate of 1.01 percent. 
Thus it appears  that  what  this paper  leaves unexplained  are  the unex- 
plained contribution  of the decline in the TV-NAIRU and the pure Robert  J. Gordon  327 
Table 8. Decomposition  of the Inflation  Surprise in the GDP Deflator,  1998:2a 
Percent  per year 
Component  of inflation  Change 
1. Predicted  inflation,  constant  NAIRU,  constant  real  prices  of food, energy,  3.73 
and  imports  (rows  3 - 2c) 
2.  Contribution  of traditional  supply  shocks 
a. Food and  energy  prices  -0.13 
b.  Import prices  -  1.30 
c.  Total  -1.42 
3.  Predicted  inflation  with actual  behavior  of supply  shocks  and  constant  2.31 
NAIRU 
4.  Contribution  of new supply  shocks 
a. Computers  -0.06 
b.  Medical  care  -0.02 
c.  Measurement  methodology  - 0.10 
d. Interaction  effect  -0.08 
e.  Total, working  through  decline  in TV-NAIRU  -0.26 
5.  Predicted  inflation  with actual  behavior  of supply  shocks  and  explained  2.05 
portion  of decline  in TV-NAIRU  (rows  3 + 4e) 
6.  Contribution  of unexplained  decline  in TV-NAIRU  -0.27 
7.  Predicted  inflation  with actual  behavior  of supply  shocks  and  estimated  TV-  1.78 
NAIRU 
8.  Error  term  in simulation  of inflation  (rows  9 - 7)  -0.77 
9.  Actual  inflation,  four  quarter  change  to 1998:2  1.01 
Source: Author's calculations  By row, 2 is from table 4,  "error for effect"  minus "error for actual value";  3 is from 
the first row of table 2, 4 and 6 are from table 6,  change  1993-1-1998.2  in TV-NAIRUs  for the GDP deflator, prorated 
among explained and unexplained components; and 7 and 9 are from the first row of table 4 
a. Percent changes are four-quarter  moving averages 
unexplained  residual. These add up to 1.04 percentage  points, or 38 
percent  of the original 2.72 point "surprise" on comparing  the predic- 
tion of the top row of the table with the actual  result  on the bottom  row. 
Clearly, the decomposition  of the unexplained 1.04 percentage  points 
depends  on the smoothness parameter  (T,)  imposed on the estimation 
of the model consisting of equations  2 and 3. The larger  is the assumed 
standard  deviation, the more  of the unexplained  component  of inflation 
will be attributed  to the unexplained  component  of the decline in the 
TV-NAIRU  and the less to the pure residual. 
However, this decomposition  of what remains  unexplained  is sensi- 
tive to the use of  the TV-NAIRU methodology. Another approach 
would  be to take  the predicted  value of inflation  net of traditional  supply 
shocks  (from  table 8) and  add  to actual  inflation  the full change  between 
1993 and 1998 contributed  by computers, medical care, and measure- 
ment methodology, which is 0.80  percentage point in table 6.  This 328  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998 
would make actual inflation 1.81 percent  rather  than 1.01 percent, and 
would reduce the unexplained  component  from 1.04 percentage  points 
to 0.50 percentage  point (2.31 from table 8 minus  the alternative  actual 
of 1.81). This approach  would suggest that  only 18 percent  (0.50/2.72) 
of the initial inflation  surprise  remains  unexplained. 
In other words, the contribution  of the three new supply shocks- 
computers,  medical care, and  measurement  methodology-depends  on 
whether it is fed through the TV-NAIRU and thus is subject to the 
associated  smoothness  assumptions,  or it is added  to the actual  inflation 
rate to create an alternative stripped inflation rate. The new supply 
shocks make a much bigger difference when this second approach  is 
followed,  and this approach is also more symmetrical to the direct 
treatment  of the traditional  supply shocks. 
This paper  goes beyond the attempt  to explain the inflation  surprise 
of the 1990s to extend previous work on the TV-NAIRU, which so far 
has been limited  to a model in which  price inflation  evolves independent 
of wage changes. Estimates  of a model of wage-wage feedback  parallel 
to the standard  model of price-price  feedback reveals a stark  contrast: 
the estimated  TV-NAIRU  for total compensation  barely  declines in the 
1990s, and all of the small decline can be attributed  to the sharp  decline 
in the rate of change of employee benefits, largely reflecting  the tran- 
sition to HMO-type  payment  systems for medical care. 
I then extend the standard  autoregressive  price and wage inflation 
models to allow for wage-to-price  and  price-to-wage  feedback.  The sum 
of the lagged  feedback  terms  is significant  only from  prices  to wages, not 
from wages to prices. Allowing for such feedback  effects alters  the esti- 
mated  TV-NAIRUs  only slightly. The results  suggest that wages would 
have accelerated  even more  during  the current  economic  expansion  with- 
out the moderating  effect of price feedback. Ignoring  the insignificant 
sums of coefficients  on the feedback  terms  in the price equations,  prices 
would have decelerated  slightly more without  the inflationary  impact  of 
wage feedback.  Thus when allowance  is made  for wage-price  feedback, 
the contrast  between  price and  wage behavior  deepens. 
The Future 
To the extent that this paper  attributes  most of the inflation  surprise 
of the 1990s to five supply shocks, the two traditional  shocks (food- Robert  J. Gordon  329 
energy and  import  prices)  and  the three  new shocks (computers,  medical 
care, and measurement  methodology), it opens debate regarding  the 
likely evolution of these shocks. The continued  arrival  of new shocks 
would be required  to continue the deceleration of inflation, given a 
constant  unemployment  rate. For instance, at a given share  of nominal 
expenditure for computers, the rate of deflation of computer prices 
would have to continue  to accelerate  as it did between 1993 and 1998. 
Steady deflation  of computer  prices at 40 percent  a year, along with a 
fixed share  of computers,  would maintain  current  inflation  without  any 
pressure  for renewed deceleration  or a reversal  toward  acceleration. 
Viewed in this perspective, between 1993 and 1998 the economy 
benefited from a powerful and interactive push toward decelerating 
inflation, resulting  from appreciation  in the dollar, a decline in real oil 
prices, an accelerated rate of decline of computer  prices, a reduced 
relative  rate of inflation  in medical care, and a series of measurement 
improvements  in the official price indexes. It is not an unreasonable 
conjecture  that each of these beneficial shocks was temporary,  which 
would imply that inflation in the future will be much more dependent 
on the gap between the actual  unemployment  rate and the NAIRU than 
has heretofore  been the case. 
The movement of the dollar cannot be forecast; the exchange rate 
might  stabilize and  could either  depreciate  or appreciate.  Oil prices may 
have fallen as far as they can and could exhibit a partial  recovery  in the 
next few years. Computer  prices may continue  to decline at 40 percent 
per year, but not at 60 percent per year. The medical care revolution 
may have reached  its limit in cost reductions, and henceforth  medical 
care  inflation  may  once again  outpace  general  inflation-a  development 
that already seems in prospect for  1999.30  And the improvements  in 
price measurement  may be complete;  note, especially, that  the national 
accounts  have since 1995 incorporated  improvements  in CPI method- 
ology that will be implemented  only in 1999. Thus the net balance of 
the supply shocks may be shifting from sharp downward  pressure  on 
the inflation  rate to neutral  or even slight upward  pressure. 
30.  See Milt Freudenheim,  "Employees Facing Steep Increases  in Health  Costs," 
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Alternative Explanations 
While this paper  explains most of the inflation  surprise  of the 1990s, 
it leaves some of it unexplained, and so leaves room for other expla- 
nations. The advocates  of the new economy view could argue  that  high- 
technology  innovation  has held down inflation.  But they must  be careful 
in explaining how the benefits of high-technology  products  could have 
held down measured  inflation  without  boosting measured  productivity. 
A complaint  that  official price indexes miss some of the impact  of such 
innovation (however justified) cannot be part of the explanation  of a 
mysterious  deceleration  in measured  inflation. 
Achieving a full explanation  of the decline in the TV-NAIRU for 
measured  price inflation may depend on developing better empirical 
counterparts  of the new economy argument.  For instance, high tech- 
nology involves more than the direct production  of computers, as in- 
cluded in the national  accounts. The pervasive role of electronic com- 
ponents  in many other products,  ranging  from automobiles  to 
supermarket  check-out scanners, may have contributed  to lower infla- 
tion but is not captured  by an analysis that limits the computer  effect 
to the narrow  1.2 percent  of GDP included in the official definition. 
This paper points toward two main areas for future research. The 
first is to explain the contrast  between decelerating  prices and acceler- 
ating wages. The easy answer  that  unmeasured  productivity  growth  has 
accelerated is unconvincing, because the price deceleration has oc- 
curred  in measured  inflation,  and  this paper  has taken  fully into account 
improvements  in measurement  methods  in the CPI and in the deflators. 
More plausible answers  are likely to focus on developments  in product 
markets  that do not apply to labor markets, going beyond the aspects 
of the computer  and medical care industries  that are explicitly treated 
here. 
A second, parallel contrast  deepens the puzzle. Unemployment  has 
fallen much more than the rate of capacity utilization has risen, once 
one allows for the much higher cyclical volatility of utilization. Since 
the utilization measure applies only to manufacturing,  mining, and 
utilities, and not to the vast service sector, this contrast  may point to 
developments in the labor market  in the service sector that have gen- 
erated  an increased  demand  for labor without  creating  additional  pres- 
sure  on industrial  capacity. It is tempting  to speculate  that  the resolution Robert  J. Gordon  331 
of the unemployment-utilization  discrepancy  lies in the much  discussed 
ability of the American economy (in contrast to the rich European 
nations) to provide abundant  jobs in the service sector-flipping  ham- 
burgers, bagging groceries, valet parking, waiting tables-without 
placing pressure  on capacity in the manufacturing  sector. 
APPENDIX  A 
Data 
THE  FOLLOWING  are the common  elements  of  the estimated  equations 
for price and wage change. The sample period is 1962:1 to 1998:2, or 
146 quarters.  All right-hand-side  variables are allowed to enter with 
lags.31  Supply shock variables  include the change in the relative price 
of imports and the change in the relative price of food and energy.32 
Dummy variables are included for when the Nixon price controls of 
1971-75  went "on"  and "off."  These dummy variables, and all the 
other variables, are defined exactly as in all my papers starting  with 
Gordon (1982).  An additional explanatory  variable is the difference 
between productivity  growth  and  its trend,  reflecting  the fact that  while 
31.  Lag lengths are chosen to be identical to those in Gordon (1990). The only 
smoothing  condition imposed on the lag distributions  involves the lagged dependent 
variable,  where twenty-four  lagged terms enter. Rather  than  estimating  that number  of 
unconstrained  coefficients, the lagged dependent  variable  is entered  as a series of four- 
quarter  moving averages of rates of change; for example, the first variable  is a four- 
quarter average of lags t  -  1 to t  -  4,  the next t  -  5 through t  -  8,  and so forth. The 
coefficients  on the individual  moving averages  are unconstrained.  Exclusion tests indi- 
cate that  the moving averages  representing  lags thirteen  through  twenty-four  enter  with 
a significance  level of better  than 1 percent  for each of the three  price indexes shown in 
figure  1 and  are  thus  highly significant.  The coefficients  on lags thirteen  through  twenty- 
four  represent  30 percent  of the total lagged effect in the equation  for the GDP deflator, 
24 percent  of the total effect for the PCE deflator,  and 35 percent  of the total effect for 
CPI-U-X  1. 
32.  The food-energy  effect is defined as the difference  of the rate of change of the 
chain-weighted  consumption  deflator  minus the rate of change of the chain-weighted 
consumption  deflator  net of food and energy. Also, the change in the real effective 
exchange  rate, included  in previous  papers, is found to be insignificant  in all versions 
estimated  for this paper,  presumably  because  its effect is swamped  by that  of the relative 
import  price. I therefore  exclude it in the results  presented  here. 332  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
the larger part of any cyclical increase or decrease in productivity  is 
reflected  in a movement  in profits  in the same direction,  a small fraction 
remains  to influence  the inflation  rate in the opposite direction.33 
Five indexes of price and wage change are studied. These are the 
official chain-weighted  GDP deflator,  the chain-weighted  PCE  deflator, 
CPI-U-X1, trend  unit labor  cost for the Employment  Cost Index-Total 
Compensation  (ECI-TC),  and  trend  unit labor  cost for the Employment 
Cost Index-Wages and Salaries  (ECI-WS). ECI-WS  differs from ECI- 
TC by excluding employee benefits. Neither ECI variable  is available 
prior to 1980:1. The ECI series are extrapolated  backward  using two 
series developed in previous research.  For the ECI-WS, I use an index 
of average hourly earnings in the nonfarm  private economy, adjusted 
for changes in interindustry  employment  mix and in the importance  of 
overtime  pay.  34  For the ECI-TC,  I use the same index multiplied  by the 
ratio of employee compensation  to wages and salaries (both from the 
National Income and Product  Accounts) to adjust it for the effective 
fraction  of employer-paid  and employee-paid  fringe benefits. Because 
changes in fringe benefits have almost always occurred in the first 
quarter  of the year, each equation for trend unit labor cost includes 
seasonal dummy  variables. 
The seasonal dummies must have mean zero in order  not to change 
the mean of the TV-NAIRU. Hence, taking the first quarter  of each 
year as an example, I use dummies equal to 0.75,  -0.25,  -0.25, 
-0.25  rather  than the usual 1, 0, 0, 0. As a result, the compensation 
version  of the wage equations  has a higher  error  variance  than  the wage- 
salary  version. These appear  only in the wage equations  (for trend  unit 
labor cost), not in the price equations. 
Alternative  measures of the TV-NAIRU are estimated for both the 
GDP and the PCE deflators  stripped  of three different elements. The 
first element is computer  expenditures  for total GDP (including PCE, 
PDE, government, and net exports) and for PCE. The second is total 
medical care expenditures,  which is entirely a component  of PCE and 
33.  The productivity  deviation  is defined  as the growth  rate  of the log ratio  of actual 
nonfarm  private  business  output  per  hour  to a log-linear  piecewise trend  running  through 
1950:2, 1954:4, 1963:3, 1972:2, 1978:3, 1987:3, and 1996:4. The 1987-96 growth  rate 
of this trend  is 1.06 percent  per year. 
34.  See Gordon  (1971, pp. 1  15-18) for a full explanation  of the construction  of this 
series and a contrast  with the conventional  data  on compensation  per hour. Robert  J. Gordon  333 
consists  of both services  and goods  expenditures.  The third is the CPI 
measurement adjustment. 
Time-series  expenditures on nominal and real expenditures on GDP 
and PCE computer expenditures and on PCE total medical care expen- 
ditures  through  1998:2  were  provided  by  Christian Ehemann  of  the 
Bureau of Economic  Analysis. 
The time series on the price measurement adjustment is taken from 
the Economic Report of the President,  February 1998,  table 2-4,  p. 80, 
with three qualifications.  First,  I do not include  the  1998  component 
for "updated market basket,"  since the PCE and GDP deflators are not 
affected by the updating of "upper-level"  weights  in the CPI. Second, 
I add an additional measurement adjustment beginning in 1992: 1, based 
on graph 1 of U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics  (1997),  which compares 
the "test"  (that is, constant measurement methods) CPI with the official 
Laspeyres  CPI. This graph appears to show  an average difference  be- 
tween the two indexes  of about  -0.15  percent per year during 1992- 
94; I reduce this to  -0.  10, to be conservative.  Third, I adjust for the 
fact that the BEA "backcast"  the 1999 implementation of "lower  level 
geometric weights'" and several other minor changes to 1995: 1. In order 
to reflect this shift in the measurement methods of the PCE deflator, I 
take the stated revisions  to the PCE deflator in Seskin  (1998,  table 4, 
p.  24)  and add the absolute  value  of  these  revisions  to the CPI mea- 
surement series. To summarize, the price measurement adjustment used 
in  this  paper  is  as  follows:  for  1992:1-1994:4,  -0.1  percent;  for 
1995:1-1995:4,  -0.53  percent; for  1996:1-1996:4,  -0.73  percent; 
for  1997:1-1997:4,  -0.49  percent;  and for  1998:1-1998:4,  -0.73 
percent. The measurement methodology  series for the GDP deflator is 
equal  to  that for  the  PCE  deflator  times  0.7,  roughly  the  share  of 
personal consumption expenditures  in GDP. Comment 
and Discussion 
James H.  Stock: From 1993 through mid-1998, the U.S.  economy 
experienced several years of low unemployment  and low and falling 
inflation  that is nothing short  of extraordinary.  What should one make 
of this experience? Is it transitory,  simply good luck, or has the econ- 
omy changed in a fundamental  way? Is the death  of the Phillips curve, 
so long proclaimed, finally a reality? 
Although it is widely known that the NAIRU is measured  with con- 
siderable  imprecision,  the recent  experience  is surprising.  For  example, 
Staiger, Watson, and I have estimated  that in 1989 the NAIRU, based 
on the GDP deflator, was 6.3  percent, with a 95 percent confidence 
interval of 5.0 to 7.4 percent.1  The United States has now been at or 
below the lower end of this confidence interval for some time, yet 
inflation  remains  quiescent. 
In his previous work, Robert  Gordon  has argued  that  the unemploy- 
ment-based  Phillips curve has been a trusty  and stable relation, at least 
through  the early 1990s. In the current  paper, he turns  his attention  to 
the events of the past  five years. His approach  to this puzzle is, sensibly, 
to ask what went wrong with the constant  NAIRU, circa-1992 Phillips 
curve. He considers four sets of factors that could have contributed  to 
the good inflation  performance,  given recent unemployment:  first, tra- 
ditional supply shocks, in particular  food and energy prices and import 
prices, which have been included in Gordon's empirical  work at least 
since  1982; second, some new supply shocks, in particular  medical 
prices and computer  prices; third, recent measurement  improvements 
1.  Staiger, Stock, and Watson  (1997, table 1). 
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in the CPI; and fourth, an otherwise unexplained  drop in the NAIRU. 
His empirical strategy is to decompose the error  that he would have 
made had he been asked, at the end of 1992, to forecast the average 
inflation  rate  for the four  quarters  ending in 1998:2, given future  values 
of the unemployment  rate, food and  energy  prices, and  his other  control 
variables, but not the future  shocks to the Phillips curve. 
Gordon  concludes that much of the fall in inflation-approximately 
1.4 percentage  points-is  attributable  to favorable traditional  supply 
shocks (declining real food and energy prices and import  prices), but 
that  declines in the NAIRU have also been an important  factor, explain- 
ing approximately  0.5 percentage  point of the surprisingly  good infla- 
tion performance.  Although the new, lower NAIRU might persist, in 
all likelihood the favorable supply shocks will not. Thus Gordon's 
explanation  of the Goldilocks economy echoes Goldilocks's fate. On 
the one hand, the bears do come home, rudely interrupting  her sleep 
and ending her consumption windfall: there is,  it turns out, no free 
lunch. On the other hand, she escapes with no more than a fright, 
presumably  to pursue  future  policies that  depend  less heavily on favor- 
able supply shocks. 
My comment  has three parts. First, I raise some disagreements  with 
aspects  of Gordon's  conceptual  framework,  especially the introduction 
of his new supply shocks. Second, I reestimate his decomposition, 
altering  aspects of his analysis with which I disagree. Third, I return  to 
the claims of proponents  of the new economy in light of this evidence 
and  provide  some further  evidence that  the puzzle is not about  inflation, 
but about  labor markets.  Because of space constraints,  this discussion 
exclusively considers inflation  as measured  by the GDP deflator. 
Part  of Gordon's explanation  for the recent good news on inflation 
involves his three new supply shocks: declining real computer  prices, 
moderation  in health care inflation, and improvements  in methods for 
measuring  inflation.  The third  of these so-called supply shocks is not a 
supply shock at all, and it is confusing for Gordon  to call it so. If one 
were modeling river flooding and the units of measurement  of river 
depths  had  switched  from  feet to meters,  one would  not call the resulting 
break  in the series a climate shock; rather, one would just adjust the 
series so that the units were comparable  over time. Similarly, because 
methods  for measuring  inflation  have changed, one needs to make an 
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same "units."2 Gordon  deserves credit for being the first in this liter- 
ature  to incorporate  such an adjustment,  but this adjustment  has little 
to do with supply shocks.3 
Although it is common sense to adjust  for known improvements  in 
measurement,  the argument  for singling out falling computer  prices and 
moderating  health  care inflation  is less clear. Returning  to the flooding 
example, this is a bit like saying  that  St. Louis suffered  flooding  because 
the Mississippi was especially deep although  the Missouri was not- 
which is no explanation at all.  Nor does it explain low inflation to 
observe that  two domestic sectors  had falling or stable  prices. Over any 
period, there always will be some sectors that contribute  positively to 
inflation and others that contribute  negatively. To justify subtracting 
the contributions  of two such sectors  requires  arguing  that  these contri- 
butions are qualitatively different from those of the other sectors, in 
other years, that have been left in. One systematic approach  to elimi- 
nating outlier sectors is to use a trimmed-mean  CPI, or perhaps the 
median  CPI. This issue is more  than semantic. Gordon  "explains" the 
decline in the NAIRU in terms of these two price shocks; but if real 
health care costs start to rise again, would one expect the NAIRU to 
rise as well? Probably  not, because (as I argue below) the decline in 
the NAIRU seems to be linked to recent developments in labor mar- 
kets.4 
As a basis for further  analysis, I have recomputed  Gordon's decom- 
position in his table 8, using a specification  that makes these and other 
minor changes. The motivation  for one regressor-the  change in pro- 
2.  This feet to meters view also leads to a different method from Gordon's for 
performing  the dynamic simulations. Rather  than treating  measurement  changes as a 
shock  with dynamic  consequences,  the dynamic  simulation  should  be performed  in base- 
quarter  (1992:4) units, and then the forecasts should be converted to current-quarter 
units. 
3.  The river depth analogy is imperfect, because the change in how inflation is 
measured  affects real activity, slightly, through  real expenditures  that  are indexed  to the 
CPI. But these effects are arguably  negligible for the purposes  of explaining  the current 
inflation-unemployment  puzzle. 
4.  This raises the question  of whether  one should control for the traditional  supply 
shocks of real food and energy prices and import price effects. One argument  for 
retaining  these supply shocks is that they are largely external to the U.S.  economy; 
another  is that  they have been included  in empirical  Phillips  curve specifications  at least 
since the early 1980s and therefore  are not subject to the ex post identification  bias 
alluded  to above. Whether  these arguments  are compelling  is a matter  of judgment,  but 
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ductivity deviation-is  unclear, so this has been omitted. Also,  the 
sample period is different, and lagged inflation  enters differently. The 
resulting  specification  is similar  to that  of Staiger, Watson, and  I.s The 
results are presented  in the first column of table B 1. When a constant 
NAIRU of 6.0 is assumed, the forecast error  for the constant  NAIRU, 
zero supply shock, dynamic forecast of GDP inflation in  1998:2 is 
essentially  the same as that of Gordon:  -  2.79  versus  -  2.75  (that is, 
1.01 -3.76)  in table 8. The TV-NAIRU  used in table B 1 is computed 
using the same value of T, as Gordon  does, and the decline of inflation 
explained by the fall in the NAIRU, 0.63 percentage  point, is close to 
Gordon's estimate of 0.53 percentage  point. The contributions  of the 
traditional  supply shocks in tables B 1 and  8 are also similar. Evidently, 
Gordon's decomposition is robust to these changes in specification. 
Interestingly,  the root mean-squared  error  of the dynamic  simulation  in 
table Bi  is less than Gordon's (0.47 versus 0.60  in table 3),  so the 
changes in the specification actually improve the performance  of the 
Phillips curve in the mid-1990s. 
This decomposition  is subject  to several sources of sampling  uncer- 
tainty:  uncertainty  about  the constant  NAIRU  through  1992;  uncertainty 
about  the TV-NAIRU and the estimate of T,; and  uncertainty  about  the 
other coefficients in the regression. The second column of table B  1 
illustrates  the effect of the uncertainty  about  the constant  NAIRU. For 
the specification  described  in the notes to the table, the estimated  con- 
stant  NAIRU is 6.3 percent. Using this value, the dynamic simulation 
forecast error is larger, and the amount of surprisingly  low inflation 
explained by a drop in the TV-NAIRU approximately  doubles, from 
0.6  percentage  point to  1.3 percentage points. A larger value of  T 
results in a lower estimate of the current  TV-NAIRU and further  in- 
creases  the amount  explained  by a drop in the NAIRU. A proper  treat- 
ment of all sources of uncertainty  would, I suspect, result in a very 
large sampling uncertainty  associated with this decomposition. This 
example also emphasizes  the importance  of the decline in the NAIRU 
to Gordon's  story. 
What  can one conclude from this about  the claims of proponents  of 
the new economy?  Gordon  characterizes  the new economy view as one 
in which  the NAIRU  has fallen. However, a more  radical  interpretation, 
5.  Staiger, Stock, and Watson  (1997). ,!  C  '41  It  Cli 
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which I believe is more in keeping with new economy rhetoric, is that 
the traditional  Phillips curve has simply ceased to be relevant. There  is 
no longer a link between the unemployment  gap and changes of infla- 
tion; according  to this view, the slope coefficient in the Phillips curve 
is now zero. Gordon's  evidence does not address  this interpretation. 
This hypothesis  is investigated  in the third  column of table B 1. The 
circa-1992 Phillips curve is estimated  through  1992:4, and  the dynamic 
simulation  proceeds  like that  in the first  column, except that from 1993 
onward the slope of the Phillips curve (more precisely, the sum of 
coefficients on the unemployment  gap) is set to zero. The results are 
remarkable.  No fancy econometrics here: simply setting this slope to 
zero makes the same contribution  as using a TV-NAIRU. Indeed, the 
simulation  root mean-squared  forecast  error  is far smaller  than  those in 
the first two columns of table B 1 and in table 3. 
Performing  an econometric test of the stability of this coefficient 
involves some subtleties. It is tempting simply to test for a break in 
1992:4 but this would be misleading, because 1992:4 was after all 
chosen by preliminary  data analysis as a likely candidate  for a break 
date. That  is, the natural  t test has data-snooping  bias. One way around 
this is to use a test for a break  at an unknown  date, such as the Quandt 
likelihood ratio test. Doing so yields a striking  finding:  the hypothesis 
of stability  of the slope coefficient is rejected  at the 5 percent  level, and 
the break  date  is estimated  to be 1993:  1! When  a regression  is estimated 
incorporating  this break  date, the coefficient  through  1992:4 is negative 
and  statistically  significant, but the coefficient for the post-1992 period 
is slightly positive and statistically insignificant. 
One is therefore  left with two competing  interpretations  of the recent 
unemployment-inflation  experience, both of which are consistent with 
the data. Either the Phillips curve is stable, except for a shift in the 
NAIRU, or the Phillips curve is now defunct, and  there  is no link from 
the unemployment  gap to changes  in inflation.  The implications  of these 
two explanations  are quite different, to put it mildly. But which is 
correct? 
It is the job of a discussant  to raise questions, not to answer them. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to provide  some insights by examining  other 
indicators  of aggregate  activity as predictors  of inflation.  Gordon  looks 
at capacity  utilization;  another  such indicator  is housing authorizations 
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results  for specifications  identical  to that  in the first  column, except that 
the unemployment  rate is replaced  by each of these indicators,  respec- 
tively, and  the "natural  rates" of capacity  utilization  and  housing starts 
are  held constant  at pre-1993 estimated  values. The results  are striking. 
These circa-1992 equations  have the same forecast error  for 1998:2- 
after adjusting  for improvements  in CPI measurement  and the actual 
paths of the traditional supply shocks, the forecast error is a mere 
-0.27  percentage  point. Moreover, their root mean-squared  forecast 
errors  are even smaller than for the unemployment  specifications  that 
resort  to a falling NAIRU and are comparable  to the specification  with 
a zero slope. These relations do not appear  to exhibit a break in the 
early 1990s: tests for a change in the sum of the coefficients on these 
variables in  1993:1 are not significant at the 10 percent level when 
evaluated  using the Quandt  likelihood ratio  test critical  values. Finally, 
note that favorable supply shocks play the same role for these specifi- 
cations as for the specifications  based on the unemployment  rate. Were 
it not for these favorable  supply shocks, inflation  today would be what 
it was in 1994. 
I suspect that the results in the fourth  and fifth columns are typical 
of what  one would find  using other  proxies for activity. Recently, Mark 
Watson and I have examined the performance  of a host of other indi- 
cators for forecasting  inflation  over the past two decades.6  The details 
of our exercise differ from the analysis here:  our data  are monthly, the 
focus is on one year  ahead  forecasts, and  the methodology  is to simulate 
real-time  forecasting  by recursively  updating  the estimated  models. Yet 
the overall message is similar. During the 1990s, the unemployment 
rate is a poor predictor  of inflation;  in addition to housing starts and 
capacity  utilization, inflation  is predicted  well by industrial  production, 
employment  growth (as opposed to the unemployment  rate), manufac- 
turing  and trade  sales, and new composite activity indexes. 
All of the above suggests that  the relation  between  inflation  and  many 
real economic indicators has been stable in the 1990s. This, in turn, 
constitutes evidence against the new economy view that the link be- 
tween inflation and aggregate activity has been weakened or broken, 
and is consistent with the view that the unemployment-based  Phillips 
curve has been stable except for a drop  in the NAIRU. Thus the puzzle 
6.  Stock and Watson  (1998a). Robert  J. Gordon  341 
is not why inflation  has been so low given the unemployment  rate, but 
rather,  why the unemployment  rate has been so low given inflation. 
When viewed this way, the answer does not lie in an investigation 
of special factors  that  have held down  price  inflation,  such as computers 
and medical prices. It suggests, instead, a closer look at labor markets 
and what changes, if any, have occurred  in these markets  in the 1990s 
but not elsewhere. Such factors might include the role of information 
technology in facilitating  job searches and changes in the welfare sys- 
tem in the United States. These results also underscore  the fact that  the 
unemployment-based  Phillips curve is but one of  several tools that 
economists should use when forecasting  inflation. 
In summary, Robert Gordon has provided a simulating paper that 
continues  his careful and important  research  into the relations  between 
wages, prices, and the unemployment  rate. This work emphasizes  the 
importance  of good fortune-in  the guise of favorable  supply  shocks- 
in explaining the current  state of the U.S. economy. Significant  ques- 
tions remain, however, about what special features of labor markets 
have led to instability in forecasting  relations  based on the unemploy- 
ment rate but not on other aggregate  indicators. 
General discussion:  Participants  discussed economic developments 
that could account for a downward  shift in the natural  rate of unem- 
ployment. Benjamin  Friedman  noted several changes in the labor  mar- 
ket that  Lawrence  Katz has frequently  emphasized.  There are a million 
more  people in prison now than  ten years ago in the United States, and 
they are probably  drawn disproportionately  from the ranks of people 
who might otherwise be unemployed. Today, a large fraction of new 
jobs involve sitting at keyboards, which implies that jobs are much 
more  flexible across companies  and industries  than  in the past. Finally, 
about  one out of seven job openings today is filled through  temp firms. 
Friedman  recalled  that  a well-functioning  employment  service has long 
been advocated  as the way to reduce  the natural  rate and reasoned  that 
we have gotten the benefits of an employment service, but through 
private  temp firms  rather  than the public sector. 
William  Dickens  was skeptical  about  the importance  of some of these 
labor  market  changes, noting that the growth in the prison population 
did not begin in 1993 and that  other  changes, such as people with poor 
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have made  the current  natural  unemployment  rate  go up. Nevertheless, 
he thought  it possible for the United States to sustain  unemployment  in 
the 4 percent range without inflation. His own bivariate  vector auto- 
regressions  with prices and wages showed that  price, rather  than  wage, 
innovations  explained  inflation, not only in the supply shock periods  of 
the 1970s but also in the 1960s and 1980s. He speculated that firms 
may have planned for capacity additions on the expectation that the 
Federal Reserve would target the prevailing estimates of the natural 
unemployment  rate. If capacity utilization was responsible for price 
pressures,  the natural  rate becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. A series 
of favorable  supply  shocks have now allowed the economy to break  this 
self-fulfilling  prophecy,  and  capacity  utilization  is low enough  to permit 
lower unemployment  rates  than  would have been predicted  from  history. 
William Brainard  noted  that  the original  motivation  behind  Phillips's 
idea was that unemployment  is a good measure of pressure in labor 
markets. Since labor costs are so important,  a tight labor market  with 
rising wages would be closely associated  with rising inflation. He rea- 
soned that the whole NAIRU idea is damaged  if that mechanism  turns 
out not to be central  to the inflation  process. James Duesenberry  sug- 
gested using wage equations  that include vacancies as an explanatory 
variable. If wages are driven by how difficult it is to fill vacancies, a 
shift in the Beveridge curve in the direction  of less unemployment  for 
given vacancies would be consistent  with the idea that  the labor  market 
functions more effectively today. He noted that unemployment  has 
historically been used in price and wage equations  due to the absence 
of reliable data  on vacancies, but this procedure  would miss apparently 
important  recent labor market  developments. 
Edmund  Phelps commented  that analysis of the natural  rate should 
make use of  the rich literature  on labor markets, much of  it from 
Europe, and should employ real explanatory variables such as real 
prices, real policies, and institutions. He saw good evidence that the 
natural  rate declined over the past ten years and that a sharp fall oc- 
curred  in the past five years. In particular,  he cited the downward  trend 
in the proportion  of the labor force who exhibit relatively high unem- 
ployment rates and the construction  boom that dates from late 1993. 
He reasoned  that  the capital  goods boom might  have lowered  the natural 
rate  through  two channels. First, it might  have raised  employment  when 
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second, even after capital has shifted to that sector from the consumer 
goods sector, construction  is relatively labor intensive. 
Charles  Schultze observed  that  because Gordon's  NAIRU for wages 
was much higher than his NAIRU for prices, his results implied the 
implausible outcome that the trend labor share would increase indefi- 
nitely. He also questioned the formulation  of Gordon's wage equa- 
tion-in  which the dependent  variable  is nominal wage growth minus 
the trend  growth  rate  of productivity-because it assumes  an immediate 
adjustment  of wages to changes in the productivity  trend. Finally, he 
disagreed with the paper's conclusion that the fall in inflation in the 
1990s did not overturn  the natural  rate framework.  He thought  it was 
more accurate  to conclude that  if the natural  rate has consistently been 
a valid explanation for the relationship  between inflation and unem- 
ployment, the paper provides an estimate of that rate and how it has 
changed over time. 
George  Perry  pointed  out that  Gordon's  estimated  NAIRU was above 
the actual  unemployment  rate  in 1962. Given that  in 1962 policymakers 
and economists outside the government  agreed on the importance  of 
getting the economy moving because unemployment  was so high, he 
felt this cast serious doubt on estimates using Gordon's  framework.  In 
the alternative,  Stock suggested that the experts were wrong in 1962, 
because they were extrapolating  previous  favorable  experience. Brain- 
ard remarked  that since the NAIRU is a smoothed two-way estimate 
generated  via Kalman  filtering, the estimated  NAIRU for the 1960s is 
influenced  by the data in the entire sample, which puts a lot of faith in 
the particular  way Gordon  has allowed change to occur. More gener- 
ally, he observed  that  the structure  behind  Gordon's  simple  econometric 
framework  could have changed in many ways,  affecting any of the 
estimated coefficients: one would get a different perspective on the 
evolution of the economy by allowing time variation  in the sum of the 
coefficients  on unemployment  or prices, rather  than  only in the NAIRU. 
And the data  probably  would not distinguish  well among such alterna- 
tive ways in which the structure  might have changed. 
Robert  Hall recalled that in 1994 Gordon  had predicted  an upward 
jump in the rate of inflation, based on the Phillips relationship  as it 
existed  at the time. This understandable  error,  he noted, called attention 
to the fact that the Phillips equations are forecasting, not structural, 
relationships:  there is no attempt at identification, and no structural 344  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
interpretation  can be given of the findings. For example, the estimated 
low forecasting  power of wages for prices in Gordon's paper  failed to 
diminish  Hall's confidence  that  imposing a 10 percent  increase  in labor 
costs on businesses would promptly raise prices. He believed it an 
important  finding  of the paper  that the joint behavior  of prices, wages, 
unemployment,  and capacity utilization  has changed. This knowledge 
is important,  even though the mechanisms  behind the change are un- 
clear. He pointed out that the paradoxical  behavior of prices today is 
nothing new, if one takes a broader  historical and cross-country  per- 
spective. Neither the collapse of U.S. prices in the 1920s nor the end 
of four big inflations described by Sargent could be explained by a 
Phillips-type  relationship.  He concluded  that  the behavior  of prices has 
been different  in different  episodes and may not be predictable. 
Hall also drew attention to recent theoretical models of the labor 
market  that seem completely orthogonal  to Phillips curve research. In 
the modern Diamond-Mortensen-Caballero  framework, the wage for 
each job match is always at its theoretical equilibrium, and Ricardo 
Caballero  has stressed  the ability  of this framework  to explain  variations 
in the natural  rate of unemployment,  both over time and across coun- 
tries, in a way that has nothing to do with any concept of adjustment 
process. Being completely adjustment  free, this framework  is dramat- 
ically at odds with the ideas in Gordon's  paper  and any Phillips curve 
research. Robert  J. Gordon  345 
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